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The current financial crisis: a brief reminder. As is well known, one of
the main causes of the 2008 financial crisis is the fact that banks underestimated
the risk of investing in high-risk mortgages. According to the news reports, this
underestimation was caused by the banks “mixing” mortgages into complex
financial instruments, which somehow lowered the estimated risks. The mixing
means, crudely speaking, that a bank made several financial instruments each
containing a small portion of each original mortgage.
It is very clear that the mixing itself does not change the overall risk, since
at the end, we still have the same high-risk mortgages. This means that, strictly
speaking, it was not the mixing itself that caused the underestimation of risk
but rather the way the risk was estimated for the financial instruments resulting
from this mixture.
What we plan to do. Some news reports blame the un-intuitive complexity
of the mixed financial instruments for the resulting mess. While some of these
instruments are indeed complex, we believe that we can explain the problem
in reasonably simple terms – and explain how this is related to uncertainty
processing.
Traditional approach to financial engineering: a brief reminder. The
main idea behind the traditional financial engineering is that to lower the risk,
we must diversify: instead of investing into a single stock or a single industry,
we invest parts of our investment amount into different stocks and/or industries,
thus lowering the risk; see, e.g., [1, 2, 4].
In financial engineering, the risk is usually gauged as the standard deviation
σ of the return on the corresponding investment (or, equivalently, as the variance
– which is the square of the standard deviation). In financial engineering, it
is usually assumed that the random risks related to different investments are
independent. Let us show how this independence explains the need to diversify
the investment portfolio.
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Let us assume that we have several different shares; a unit share of the i-th
company costs ui and its return has a (predicted) standard deviation si . The risk
is the same for all the shares of the i-th company, so the risk (standard deviation)
doubles if we buy 2 shares, triples if we buy three shares, etc. In general, if we
def
decide to invest an amount xi into such shares, we buy ni = xi /ui shares. The
risk in the resulting investment is thus equal to σi = ni ·si = (xi /ui )·si = ki ·xi ,
def

where we denoted ki = si /ui .
If we split the investment amount x between several stocks, by dividing x into
x = x1 +. . .+xn and investing xi in the i-th stock, the standard deviation related
to the i-th stock is σi = ki · xi . Since the risks associated with different stocks
are assumed to be independent (and variances add for
p independent events),
we conclude that the overall risk σ is equal to σ = k12 · x21 + . . . + kn2 · x2n .
Formulas for describing and minimizing the resulting risk were the first result
in financial engineering [3], results for which their author Harry M. Markowitz
was awarded the Nobel prize in 1990.
A simple example can explain why the above diversification lowers the risk.
Indeed, suppose that we have n different stocks with the same risk per cost
k1 = . . . = kn = k. If we invest the whole amount x into one of these stocks,
the risk is equal to k · x. If instead we divide this amount into n equal parts
x1 = . . . = xn = x/n and invest each part into the corresponding stock, then
the risk of resulting investment will be equal to
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Thus,
√ a simple division of the stock into n parts decreases the risk by a factor
of n: if we divide into n = 4 parts, we decrease the risk to a half, if we divide
into n = 100 parts, we decrease the risk by a factor of 10, etc.
How the traditional approach has lead to the current crisis. From
this viewpoint, if we want to invest into risky mortgages, it makes sense not to
invest into a single one, but rather invest a small amount of money into each
of these mortgages, thus lowering the resulting risk. So far, so good, and this
“slicing” indeed lowers the risk. However, the problem is that this is exactly
what all the banks and mortgage companies were doing: each of the banks
and companies, to minimize its risks, invested the money into similar “sliced”
(mixed) combinations of the same mortgages. Thus, we get a lot of mixed
financial instruments. Now comes the important part.
An investment fund wants to invest its money. It can just invest into a single financial instrument, but that will not be diversified enough. So, following
the reasonable advice of financial engineering, the investment fund invests in
several different financial instruments. According to the traditional approach
to financial engineering, we assume that the risks of investing in different instruments are independent. Under this assumption, as we have shown, when
we start with the risk per dollar σ for each individual instrument, then, by
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spreading the investment
between n instruments, we should lower the risk to
√
σestimated = σ/ n. If we spread our investment amount between a large number
of instruments n À 1, we can drastically decrease the risk.
However, in this particular case, the independence assumption is clearly false:
all the instruments combine the same mortgages, and therefore, their risks are
actually strongly correlated. Since they invest in the same mortgages, the risk
per dollar is the same actual risk σactual = σ, no matter how many instruments
we combine.
So, we face the situation in which the traditional financial engineering tools
drastically underestimate the risk:
σ
σestimated = √ ¿ σactual = σ.
n
How uncertainty processing can help to avoid such crises. This explanation shows that a more adequate uncertainty processing can help us avoid
such situations in the future:
• First, in addition to purely formal mathematical tools, we should use common sense, expert opinion, etc.; some of this expert opinion is imprecise,
so we may need to use fuzzy techniques or other techniques for handling
such imprecise statements.
• Second, in situations when we do not have information about the possible
dependence of different financial instruments, instead of assuming independence (as it is done now), we should use imprecise probability tools to
take into account the possibility of dependence.
Final comment: this is especially important for financial engineering.
An important question is: the independence assumption is typical in science
and engineering; see, e.g., [5]. It is well understood that this assumption is
often false. Nevertheless, it is frequently used and rarely leads to catastrophic
consequences: why?
The reason is that in science and engineering, we start with a data processing
algorithm – that was usually developed without taking uncertainty into account
– and we estimate the resulting uncertainty. Even if we have a model which in
some rare cases drastically underestimates uncertainty, it is a rare occasion to
hit these cases. In financial engineering, instead, we are actively soliciting the
situations in which the (estimated) uncertainty is the smallest. So, if for the
estimated uncertainty there is a case when this estimated uncertainty is very
small, our minimization process will lead to exactly this case.
Thus, in financial engineering, it is even more important to take into account
dependence and expert information than in science and engineering.
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